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Michael Tonry
Intermediate Sanctions in
Sentencing Guidelines
ABSTRACT
Every American state has created new intermediate sanctions in recent
years and nearly half have, have had, or are considering having sentencing
guidelines. Guidelines can reduce sentencing disparities, including race,
gender, and geographical disparities; effect changes in statewide
sentencing patterns; and coordinate sentencing policies and corrections
resources. Well-managed intermediate sanctions can scale punishment
severity to crime seriousness and save money. Some research suggests
positive effects on offenders' treatment participation. These aims,
however, are often frustrated by judges' decisions to use intermediate
sanctions for offenders different from those for whom programs are
designed. As a result, some states are now incorporating intermediate
sanctions into guidelines. A number of concepts-including "purposes at
sentencing" and "parsimony"-and a number of mechanisms-zones of
discretion, categorical exceptions, and dispositional presumptions-show
promise as means to that end.
New intermediate sanctions, punishments less burdensome and intru-
sive than imprisonment but more so than standard probation, have
been developed in every state since 1980, and nearly half the states
have, have had, or are developing sentencing guidelines. In comparison
with a quarter century ago, both developments are striking; few states
then had programs that would today be considered intermediate sanc-
tions, and not one had sentencing guidelines. From a late-1990s per-
spective, neither intermediate sanctions nor guidelines are novel. What
is novel, however, is that policy makers in many American jurisdictions
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have begun to recognize that intermediate sanctions and guidelines
may be necessary complements if either is to achieve its primary pur-
poses. I stress "American" because no other Western country has
adopted sentencing guidelines' and few have experienced an equivalent
proliferation of new sanctions. This essay is as a result parochially
American in its focus.
Both guidelines and intermediate sanctions are thriving. Guidelines
were in effect in more states early in 1998 than ever before, and both
the number of intermediate sanctions programs and the number of
people supervised in them grow every year. A principal reason both are
thriving is that they can accomplish many of the goals policy makers
set for them. A second is that policy makers in many states are worried
about the fiscal consequences for state budgets of recently enacted
mandatory minimum sentencing laws, "three-strikes" laws, and gen-
eral increases in the severity of sentences for violent offenders. Legisla-
tors in a number of states, notably including North Carolina (Wright
1997), Ohio (Rauschenberg 1997), and Pennsylvania (Kempinen
1997), have enacted laws that will increase use of prison sentences and
lengthen terms for violent offenders while reducing use of prison sen-
tences for nonviolent offenders and diverting them into sanctions pro-
grams. In each of these states, funds have been appropriated both to
build more prisons and to pay for more community-based programs.
Coordinating sentencing policies expressed in guidelines with the op-
eration of intermediate sanctions may be the way to make ambitious
new punishment policies workable and affordable.
Consider guidelines first (M. Tonry 1996, chaps. 1-3). State guide-
lines received considerable national attention in the 1980s and much
less since. Yet there are many more guidelines systems in operation
in the 1990s than in the 1980s, and they are typically more effective.
Guidelines come in two broad forms: presumptive and voluntary. Pre-
sumptive guidelines, as the words suggest, establish rebuttable pre-
' Although new sentencing laws adopted in the 1970s in Finland (T6rnudd 1997) and
in the 1980s in Sweden (von Hirsch 1993) are sometimes referred to as "guidelines,"
they consist of a series of statutory presumptions that bear little resemblance to numeri-
cal American guidelines expressed, usually, in grid format. Dutch prosecutorial guide-
lines setting standards for prosecutors' sentence recommendations to judges are closer
but do not give rise to appeal rights and, of course, do not create presumptions for
judges. English case law includes "guideline judgments" that in some sense constitute
guidelines for trial judges, but they are broad in scope, and there is little evidence that
they significantly constrain trial judges' decisions (Ashworth 1995).
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sumptions about appropriate sentences in individual cases. Judges can
impose some other sentence by "departing" but must then give reasons
for the departure that are subject to appellate review if a party objects.
Voluntary guidelines create no presumptions. They are in effect sug-
gestions that the judge may accept if he or she wishes to do so.
Although as many as ten states adopted voluntary guidelines in the
late 1970s and the 1980s, the few that were evaluated were shown to
have few or no effects on sentencing patterns, and most were aban-
doned or fell into desuetude. Delaware adopted voluntary guidelines
in 1987 that remain in effect. Florida established voluntary guidelines
in 1983 and later made them presumptive. More recently, Arkansas,
Missouri, and Virginia adopted voluntary guidelines. Sentencing com-
missions in Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maryland were at work in
1997 on efforts to replace voluntary guidelines adopted in the early
1980s with presumptive guidelines.
Only a few states initially adopted presumptive guidelines-Minne-
sota in 1980, Pennsylvania in 1981, and Washington in 1984-but
they were adjudged reasonably effective at reducing disparities, dimin-
ishing scope for gender and racial bias, and improving coordination be-
tween sentencing policy and corrections resources. Newer presumptive
schemes have since taken effect in Oregon, Tennessee, Kansas, North
Carolina, and Ohio.
A principal criticism of early guidelines systems was that they were
too limited in scope (Blumstein et al. 1983, chap. 3). The successful
Minnesota and Washington guidelines in the 1980s governed decisions
of who was sent to prison, and for how long, but set no standards for
imposition of jail sentences, intermediate sanctions, or standard proba-
tion. Since fewer than 25 percent of convicted felons in many states
are sentenced to state prison, those early guidelines systems were far
from comprehensive. More recent systems in other states, exemplified
by North Carolina's new and Pennsylvania's revised guidelines, how-
ever, now cover felonies, misdemeanors, and all types of sanctions.
The story concerning intermediate sanctions is similar-more at-
tention and excitement in the 1980s but more, and more sophisticated,
activity today (M. Tonry 1996, chap. 4). New "intermediate sanctions"
appeared in the 1980s and quickly spread. They included various forms
of intensive probation, house arrest, electronic monitoring, boot
camps, day-reporting centers, and day fines. Except for day fines, all
can be operated as "front-end" or "back-end" programs. Entry into
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front-end programs is controlled by judges; corrections officials con-
trol entry into back-end programs, often in connection with early re-
lease systems.
Intermediate sanctions were typically conceptualized as punishments
located on a continuum between prison and probation and were sup-
posed to be more intrusive and burdensome than standard probation
(Morris and Tonry 1990, chaps. 1, 3). Proponents promised that the
new punishments would cost less than jail or prison, reduce prison
crowding, and cut recidivism rates. Although major evaluations of day-
reporting centers and day fines had not been published by the end of
1997, evaluations of intensive probation, house arrest, electronic moni-
toring, and boot camps were available, and they did not confirm over-
enthusiastic proponents' predictions (Clear and Braga 1995; M. Tonry
1996, chap. 4). Evaluated front-end programs typically experienced re-
cidivism rates for new crimes neither higher nor lower than those of
other sanctions for comparable offenders (but often much higher rates
of technical violations and revocations), but because of extensive net-
widening and high rates of technical violations and revocations, front-
end programs often cost more than confinement and worsened prison
crowding. Back-end programs had similar recidivism-rate experiences
but because corrections officials' control of entry prevented net-widen-
ing were more effective at achieving cost savings and reducing prison
population pressures.
Because intermediate sanctions have multiple purposes, the evalua-
tion findings have not deprived them of credibility and support, as ear-
lier mention of recent developments in North Carolina (Lubitz 1996),
Pennsylvania (Kempinen 1997), and Ohio (Rauschenberg 1997) dem-
onstrates: all these states have greatly increased state funding for
county-level intermediate sanctions at the same time as guidelines were
drafted to encourage and systematize their use. There are several rea-
sons for this. First, from a retributive perspective, intermediate sanc-
tions can be much more punitive than probation and can be scaled in
severity to the seriousness of crimes. Evaluations show that intermedi-
ate sanctions can deliver much more intrusive and burdensome punish-
ments than standard probation; that is why technical violation and re-
vocation rates are high (M. Tonry 1996, chap. 4). Second, national
evaluations of intensive probation (Petersilia and Turner 1993) and
boot camps (MacKenzie and Souryal 1994; MacKenzie 1995) suggest,
but do not prove, that intermediate sanctions with strong treatment
components can improve treatment effectiveness and thereby reduce
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recidivism rates (Gendreau, Cullen, and Bonta 1994). Third, experi-
ence with back-end programs shows that intermediate sanctions can
save money and prison resources if ways can be found to eliminate or
greatly diminish net-widening (Parent 1995).
Thus, intermediate sanctions can be used to save money and prison
use, without significant sacrifices in public safety. The trick is to reduce
net-widening in front-end programs. In the American legal system,
judges decide who is not sentenced to prison. Since that power is un-
likely to be taken away, ways need to be devised to set enforceable
standards for sentences other than imprisonment. Sentencing guide-
lines may be the answer.
North Carolina (Wright 1997) and Ohio (Rauschenberg 1997) have
adopted new guidelines systems incorporating standards for use of in-
termediate sanctions. Pennsylvania in 1994 overhauled its thirteen-
year-old guidelines to do the same thing (Kempinen 1997; Kramer and
Kempinen 1997). The Massachusetts sentencing commission in 1996
presented a proposal for similar guidelines to the Massachusetts legis-
lature (H. Tonry 1996). Commissions are at work on such plans in sev-
eral other states and the pressures of rising prison populations and cor-
rections budgets are likely to encourage more states to consider such
initiatives.
The early evidence from North Carolina suggests that guidelines in-
corporating intermediate sanctions can work (Lubitz 1996). The
North Carolina guidelines cover all felonies and misdemeanors and at-
tempt to increase use of prison sentences for violent crimes. They also
attempt to reduce prison use for nonviolent crimes by directing judges
to sentence more offenders to intermediate sanctions. Both things hap-
pened in 1995, the guidelines' first full year of operation. Eighty-one
percent of violent felons received prison sentences, up from 67 percent
in 1993. Twenty-three percent of nonviolent felons were sent to
prison, down from 42 percent in 1993. For all imprisoned felons, the
mean predicted time to be served increased from sixteen to thirty-
seven months. Those trends continued in 1996 (North Carolina Sen-
tencing and Policy Advisory Commission 1997).
Notwithstanding North Carolina's apparent success, it is small won-
der that earlier guidelines dealt only with prison (and occasionally jail)
sentences. A number of serious impediments prevented development
of more comprehensive guidelines. First, judges in many states fiercely
resisted the very idea of guidelines and overcoming that resistance for
prison guidelines was challenge enough (M. Tonry 1996, chap. 6). In
204 Michael Tonry
some states, including New York, Maine, Connecticut, and South Car-
olina, judicial resistance could not be overcome, and no guidelines
were adopted (von Hirsch, Knapp, and Tonry 1987, chap. 2).
Second, guidelines cannot realistically set standards for noncon-
finement sentences, nor can judges be expected to follow them, unless
credible programs exist to which offenders can be sentenced. Until re-
cently, few states had extensive community corrections programs, es-
pecially outside the big cities. A number of states have now begun to
provide community corrections funding to counties that makes the op-
eration of well-managed intermediate sanctions feasible; many states as
yet have not.
Third, nonconfinement guidelines present more complex issues than
do prison guidelines. For serious violent crimes, and for chronic of-
fenders, the current crime and the past criminal record are in many
cases the primary considerations relevant to sentencing. Guidelines
grids that array crime categories along one axis and criminal history
along the other can efficiently encapsulate the major criteria for those
cases. Sentencing for less serious crimes and offenders entails other
considerations for many judges: might drug or sex offender treatment
be more effective than confinement, what are the likely collateral ef-
fects of imprisonment on the offender and his family, are there special
circumstances of the offense or the offender's or the victim's character-
istics that make one kind of sentence more appropriate than another?
The two-axis grid by itself is not a very efficient way to address these
and other offender-specific considerations. Offense severity and crimi-
nal history are in effect linear variables and can easily be scaled on
one axis of a grid. Other ethically relevant characteristics of offenses
and offenders may or may not apply in particular cases and accord-
ingly cannot easily be expressed along a single axis (M. Tonry 1996,
chap. 1).
Incorporation of intermediate sanctions into sentencing guidelines
is in its earliest days. There are, nonetheless, a number of techniques
that have been developed and ideas that have been examined. They are
sketched in this introduction and are discussed at length in the body
of this essay. Jurisprudential ideas like the principle of parsimony
(Tonry 1994) and the contrast between purposes of and at sentencing
(Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3) when combined with techniques al-
ready in use, such as zones of discretion and categorical exceptions, of-
fer tools for meaningful incorporation of intermediate sanctions into
sentencing guidelines.
Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines
Fundamental normative questions must be faced, and resolved, if
meaningful policies are to be set governing use of intermediate sanc-
tions. Debate has long been waged over the principles that should gov-
ern sentencing. On one side have been proponents of deontological
moral theories variously called retribution, reprobation, or just deserts
that attach high importance to proportionality in punishment and ap-
portionment of the severity of punishment to the seriousness of crime
(e.g., von Hirsch 1992; Duff 1996). Although it is impossible for ad-
herents of such views to specify the absolute punishments uniquely ap-
propriate for any particular crimes, it is possible-on the basis of
widely held views about the relative seriousness of various crimes-to
devise proportionate schemes in which punishment is commensurate
to offense severity. Once, in the specialized vocabulary of these analy-
ses, "anchoring points" have been set that establish the most and least
severe punishments to be used, a system of "ordinal proportionality"
can be created in which punishments are arrayed between those ex-
tremes; if offenses, for example, are graded into ten levels of relative
severity, punishments can be specified that assure that all persons con-
victed of level 6 crimes are punished more severely than those con-
victed of level 5 crimes and less severely than those convicted of level
7 crimes (von Hirsch 1993). Since the severity of crimes is integral to
determination of just punishments, just deserts and similar theories re-
quire that offense severity and (sometimes) some measure of past crim-
inality be the only allowable considerations in setting punishments.
On the other side are teleological theories in which punishment is a
means to an end but not an end in itself (Walker 1991). For most of
the past century, until the mid-1970s, utilitarian theories encom-
passing rehabilitative, deterrent, and incapacitative considerations were
predominant. More recently, hybrid theories incorporating both re-
tributive and utilitarian elements have been influential. Norval Mor-
ris's "limiting retributivism," for example, looks to retributive consid-
erations to set upper and lower limits of deserved punishments that
justly may be imposed but allows consideration of utilitarian purposes
within those limits (Morris 1974; Frase 1997). The Finnish scholar Pa-
trik T6rnudd (like many other European scholars) has argued that just
punishment requires "asymmetrical proportionality": punishments
may not exceed the maximum that can be justified by reference to of-
fense severity but may be less (T6rnudd 1997). Both utilitarian and hy-
brid theories allow consideration at sentencing of matters other than
current and past criminality. In utilitarian theories, any information
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that is ethically relevant to achieving valid goals may be taken into ac-
count. For hybrid theories also, since proportionality notions set only
outer or upper limits, any ethically relevant information may be con-
sidered.
Bluntly put, retributive and just deserts theories allow little room for
use of intermediate sanctions. Proportionality concerns require that
punishment severity be scaled to the seriousness of crimes, which
means that the metric is some measure of painfulness or intrusiveness,
and offenders convicted of comparably serious crimes must receive
comparably severe punishments (Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3; von
Hirsch 1993, afterword). Few punishments are as intrusive or burden-
some as imprisonment, which means that there can be little substitu-
tion of nonincarcerative for incarcerative penalties. As a result, propo-
nents of just deserts theories argue that there can be relatively little
overlap in a just punishment system between generically different
kinds of punishments (von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene 1989).
Hybrid theories, by contrast, can easily countenance substitutions
between punishments of different types for crimes of comparable seri-
ousness or even for the same crimes so long as the outer bounds of
deserved and undeserved punishment are not exceeded. Utilitarians are
not subject even to those bounds.
Parsimony. Two concepts-"the principle of parsimony" and the
distinction between "purposes of and at sentencing"-can provide
guidance for incorporating intermediate sanctions into comprehensive
sentencing systems (Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3; Tonry 1994).
The parsimony concept derives from the writings of Jeremy Bentham
who argued that the goal of the state should be to maximize happiness
or satisfaction and, accordingly, that whatever policy would do that
should be adopted. However, no unhappiness could be justified that
was not outweighed by other gains. If punishing people severely,
thereby imposing unhappiness, deterred others from committing
crimes that would have caused even greater aggregate unhappiness, the
punishment could be justified. However, if no or lesser unhappiness
would be avoided by imposition of the punishment, then it could not
be justified. Inflicting pain or unhappiness on anyone, including of-
fenders, is a bad thing and can only be justified when some larger good
is achieved. The offender's happiness is no more or less important than
anyone else's and must be taken into account.
The "principle of parsimony," a concept revived in the writing of
Norval Morris (1974), prescribes that the least painful or burdensome
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punishment that will achieve valid social purposes be imposed. This
is not an unfamiliar concept. Modern lawyers, and the American Bar
Association's (1994) standards for sentencing, call for use of the "least
restrictive alternative." In the jargon of modern computer software,
parsimony or the least restrictive alternative is the default position. Ap-
plied to policies governing intermediate sanctions, the principle of par-
simony would require imposition of the least painful, burdensome, or
intrusive punishment that achieves the purposes being sought.
Purposes at Sentencing. The distinction between purposes of and at
sentencing complements the parsimony idea. Purposes of sentencing
are those general purposes to be sought from the general practice of
sentencing-deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation,
moral education, validation of important behavioral norms. Not all of
these are equally pertinent in every case. Purposes at sentencing are
those that apply to a particular case, and they will generally be nar-
rower and more specific than the broader set of purposes that guide
the sentencing system generally. Different purposes at sentencing will
often call for different sanctions for people who committed similar or
identical crimes.
Together, as is discussed in Section II in conjunction with many ex-
amples, the principle of parsimony and the notion of purposes at sen-
tencing provide a framework for the development of rules governing
use of intermediate sanctions.
Zones of Discretion. Most guidelines commissions that have tried to
expand their guidelines' coverage to include nonconfinement sentences
have altered the traditional guidelines format to include more zones of
discretion. The first guidelines in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington divided their grids into two zones. One contained confinement
cells setting presumptive ranges for incarcerative sentences, and the
other contained nonconfinement cells that gave the judge unfettered
discretion to impose any other sentence, often including an option of
jail sentences up to one year.
New North Carolina, revised Pennsylvania, and proposed Massa-
chusetts guidelines, by contrast, have four or more zones. The details
vary, but they follow a common pattern. Sentences other than those
authorized by the applicable zone are departures for which reasons
must be given that are subject to review on appeal. One zone contains
cells in which only prison sentences are presumed appropriate. A sec-
ond might contain cells in which judges may choose between restric-
tive intermediate sanctions, such as residential drug treatment, house
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arrest with electronic monitoring, and a day-reporting center, and a
prison sentence up to a designated length. A third might contain cells
in which judges may choose among restrictive intermediate punish-
ments. A fourth might authorize judges to choose between restrictive
intermediate sanctions and a less restrictive penalty like community
service or standard probation. A fifth might authorize sentencing
choices only among less restrictive community penalties.
Punishment Units. A second approach that Oregon adopted and
several other states considered is to express punishment in generic
"punishment units" into which all sanctions can be converted. A hypo-
thetical system might provide, for example, for the following conver-
sion values:
* One year's confinement 100 units
* One year's partial confinement 50 units
* One year's house arrest 50 units
* One year's standard probation 20 units
* 25 days' community service 50 units
* 30 days' intensive supervision 5 units
* 90 days' income (day fines) 100 units
* 30 days' electronic monitoring 5 units
If guidelines, for example, set 120 punishment units as the presumptive
sentence for a particular offender, a judge could impose any combina-
tion of sanctions that represented 120 units.
In practice, the punishment unit approach has proven too compli-
cated to be feasible. Oregon made tentative efforts to incorporate pun-
ishment units in its guidelines but did not follow through. Pennsylva-
nia considered including the punishment unit concept in its revised
1994 guidelines but abandoned the idea as unworkable.
Exchange Rates. Another approach is simply to specify equivalent
custodial and noncustodial penalties and to authorize judges to impose
them in the alternative. Washington's commission did this in a modest
way and later proposed a more extensive system, which the legislature
did not adopt. Partial confinement and community service were ini-
tially authorized as substitutes for presumptive prison terms on the
bases of one day's partial confinement or three day's community ser-
vice for one day of confinement.
The difficulty is that community service programs to be credible
must be enforced, and experience in this country and elsewhere in-
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structs that they must be short. That is why the best-known American
program, designed to be used for offenders who otherwise would re-
ceive jail sentences up to six months, set seventy hours as the standard
work obligation. Under a three-days'-community-service-equals-one-
day's-confinement policy, seventy hours of community service would
substitute for only three days' confinement. No jurisdiction has as yet
figured out how to operate an exchange-rate system.
Categorical Exceptions. Categorical exception policies, focusing not
on the sanction but on the offender, are permissive. They authorize,
but do not direct, judges to disregard otherwise applicable sentencing
ranges if offenders meet specified criteria. One example is Rule 5.K.1
in the federal guidelines that empowers judges to depart from guide-
lines if the prosecution files a motion proposing such a departure be-
cause the defendant has provided "substantial assistance [to the gov-
ernment] in the investigation or prosecution of another person."
Washington State has developed extensive categorical exception pol-
icies. Under the First-Time Offender Waiver, judges may disregard
otherwise applicable guidelines in sentencing qualifying offenders, and
guidelines commentary indicates that "the court is given broad discre-
tion in setting the sentence." Washington has also established categor-
ical exception policies for dealing with a "special sex offender sentenc-
ing alternative" that authorizes judges to suspend prison sentences for
most first-time sex offenders and for a "work ethic [boot] camp" pro-
gram that permits substitution of four to six months' boot camp for
twenty-two to thirty-six months in prison.
Likely Future Developments. Future sentencing commissions no
doubt will develop current ideas in new ways. None of the commis-
sions that have adopted a zones-of-discretion approach, for example,
have attempted to provide guidance to judges on how to choose among
authorized intermediate sanctions or community penalties or between
intermediate sanctions and authorized confinement or community sanc-
tions. This could easily be done by setting presumptions that particular
kinds of sanctions are appropriate for particular kinds of offenders: an
obvious example would be a policy that residential drug treatment be
presumed appropriate for a drug-dependent chronic property offender.
Use of categorical exceptions likewise could be fine-tuned. The fed-
eral and Washington State examples given above, for example, are per-
missive, entirely within the judge's discretion. A state might, however,
want to make some categorical exceptions permissive and others pre-
sumptive. A first offender exception, like Washington's, might be per-
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missive, while a "substantial assistance" sentence reduction might be
made presumptive.
More states will face the issues discussed in this essay. Most states
have in recent years enacted laws mandating greatly lengthened sen-
tences for violent offenders and for some drug and repeat offenders.
Under the incentive of federal funds for prison construction, many
states now require that violent offenders serve at least 85 percent of
those longer sentences. Forecasts of enormous resulting increases in
prison operating costs led the North Carolina legislature to adopt
guidelines intended to carry out those policies for violent offenders but
also to divert many nonviolent offenders from prison to less expensive
intermediate sanctions. Many states will face the same financial
choices, and some, at least, are likely to try to follow the paths that
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts have charted.
Besides the preceding introductory discussion, this essay has three
sections. Section I discusses efforts to date to incorporate intermediate
sanctions into sentencing guidelines. Four or five different approaches
have been tried. None has yet been demonstrated to be successful, but
several are promising. Section II is more speculative and suggests ways
that current developments might be extended better to achieve their
goals. Section III is a brief conclusion.
I. Efforts to Date
The trick will be to establish both a graduated array of punishments
between prison and probation and a system for appropriately distribut-
ing offenders among them. Knowledge exists on how to create and op-
erate cost-effective intermediate sanctions. Knowledge also exists on
how to create and operate systems of presumptive sentencing guide-
lines that effectively structure judicial decisions about confinement.
Little experience exists, however, on tying the two developments to-
gether.
A. Obstacles
Intermediate sanctions have not been overlooked by sentencing
commissions or by draftsmen of guidelines enabling legislation. Sec-
tion 9(5)(2) of the statute creating Minnesota's commission authorized
the establishment of nonincarceration guidelines: "The sentencing
guidelines promulgated by the commission may also establish appro-
priate sentences for prisoners for whom imprisonment is not proper.
Any [such] guidelines .. .shall make specific reference to noninstitu-
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tional sanctions including but not limited to the following: payment
of fines, day fines, restitution, community work orders, work release
programs in local facilities, community-based residential and nonresi-
dential programs, incarceration in a local correctional facility, and pro-
bation and the conditions thereof."
The Minnesota commission's guidelines created presumptions as to
who among convicted felons should be sent to state prison (roughly 20
percent) and for how long but set no presumptions for sentences for
nonimprisonment sanctions for felons or for sentences of any kind for
misdemeanants.
For a variety of reasons, guidelines for use of nonincarcerative pun-
ishments run into special problems. These include a shortage (in some
places, the absence) of credible, well-managed intermediate sanctions
and an instinctive resistance by many judges to proposals for nonin-
carcerative guidelines. These are soluble problems. The challenge is to
do both things simultaneously, and that has proven difficult.
This need for simultaneity has not gone unnoticed by policy makers.
North Carolina, as noted below, has moved further than any other
state toward structured use of intermediate sanctions. In the statutory
background were both enabling legislation to create the Sentencing
Policy and Advisory Commission and to adopt guidelines and the
State-County Criminal Justice Partnership Act, which encourages and
provides financial incentives for creation of new county-level programs
(see, e.g., Roark and Price 1997). Pennsylvania also has moved both to
include intermediate sanctions in its guidelines and to foster and fund
new community-based programs (Kempinen 1997).
The widespread perception that community sentencing is too com-
plicated and inherently too individualized to be subjected to general
rules is likely to prove a formidable obstacle. Many judges believe that
guidelines are in principle incompatible with the mildly-to-moderately
serious crimes for which intermediate sanctions are most appropriate.
While fairly simple systems for proportioning prison time to crime se-
verity may work for the most serious crimes, more considerations-
appropriate treatment conditions, effects on the offender's family and
employment, the judge's reasons for imposing a particular sentence,
the aggregate burden of multiple work, restriction-on-liberty, treat-
ment, and monetary conditions-are often seen as relevant for less se-
rious crimes and cannot easily be encapsulated in a guidelines grid.
However, many judges have been persuaded that presumptive impris-
onment guidelines improve the quality of sentencing generally. There
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is no reason why they cannot likewise be persuaded of the merits of
nonincarcerative guidelines, assuming the guidelines make substantive
sense.
B. Efforts
Commissions are at work in many states on proposals to integrate
intermediate and noncustodial penalties into guidelines and to devise
systems of interchangeability between prison and nonprison sanctions.
Three sets of interrelated issues must be faced. First, should guidelines
permit judges to choose between incarcerative and nonincarcerative
sanctions and, if so, to what extent? Second, how are choices among
different kinds of nonincarcerative sanctions to be made? Third, how
authoritative ought guidelines to be about intermediate sanctions?
These questions are discussed below. Because little writing or policy
discussion has focused on the second and third, most of the discussion
concerns the first. This subsection B discusses the first question. Sub-
sections C and D discuss the others.
Three devices have been used to authorize judges to choose between
prison and nonprison sentences for cases that fall within a single guide-
lines cell. Delaware's unique guidelines offer a fourth approach. One
device is to create cells in guidelines grids that expressly authorize
judges to choose between sentencing options. The second is to estab-
lish "interchangeability policies" that allow judges to substitute equiva-
lently burdensome punishments for imprisonment. The third is to cre-
ate categorical exception policies that allow judges to disregard
otherwise applicable guidelines for qualifying offenders. These usually
involve boot camps, first offenders, or sex offenders. Delaware's guide-
lines set five "sanctioning levels." Because they are voluntary guide-
lines, the interchangeability question does not arise. Because they es-
tablish a continuum of sanctions of graded severity, they warrant
mention.
1. Interchangeability. Every guidelines system allows for inter-
changeability between prison and nonprison sentences, although the
extent of interchangeability varies widely. Just deserts arguments have
been made that such interchangeability should never or only seldom
be permitted because sanctions vary fundamentally in their character
(e.g., von Hirsch, Wasik, and Greene 1989). If punishment is largely
about attributions of blameworthiness, the argument goes, punish-
ments should be closely proportioned to the seriousness of crimes.
Punishments are qualitatively different and permitting substitutions
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Minor Fines
FIG. 1.-Just deserts pyramid grid
among them obscures differences in offenders' blameworthiness. Thus,
guidelines incorporating different kinds of punishments should permit
little or no overlap in their use.
Figure 1 shows what such a system might look like. The most seri-
ous crimes are at the top of the pyramid and for them only full-time
incarceration would be authorized. In the next lower tier, partial incar-
ceration such as day or night confinement, house arrest, work release,
or day-reporting would be permitted. The third tier might include in-
tensive forms of supervision, the fourth substantial fines, the fifth stan-
dard probation, and the sixth minor fines. Within each tier, choices
could be made only between sanctions that were equivalently burden-
some, and imposition of punishments from different tiers on compara-
ble offenders would ordinarily be forbidden. Thus, for particular de-
fendants, judges would seldom be permitted to choose between
incarcerative and nonincarcerative sentences.
To be realistic, figure 1 would need to be developed in more detail.
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FIG. 2.-Just deserts pyramid grid with criminal history. Applicable criminal history
categories are shown in each cell. One is the lowest.
How that might be done is shown in figure 2. Within offense severity
levels, for example, sublevels could specify ranges of allowable sentence
durations or amounts for different offenses. In a similar manner, taking
account of prior records could be done in various ways. Figure 2 does
this by indicating criminal record categories atop each cell. At the
grid's top, where offense severity is the primary consideration, the rela-
tive weight of prior records is small. Lower down, where offense sever-
ity is less, the weight of prior records, and of discrimination among
them, is greater.
No jurisdiction has adopted a system like those set out in figures 1
and 2. Plausible arguments can be made that their premise-that
blameworthiness measured only in terms of current and past crimes is
the only valid calibrator of sentences-is oversimplified (e.g., M.
Tonry 1996, chap. 1). In any event, every existing guidelines system
permits some interchangeability between incarcerative and nonincar-
cerative punishments.
a. Residual Intercbangeability. Minnesota's guidelines, for example
(fig. 3 shows Minnesota's grid as it was in 1985), permit interchange-
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ability in three ways. First, for any case falling into a cell above the
bold black line, judges have broad discretion to choose among a jail
term up to twelve months, any combination of nonincarcerative pun-
ishments, and split sentences combining jail time with other penalties.
This is no small power since 80-85 percent of felony defendants fell
within cells above the line (Knapp 1984). Moreover, the guidelines do
not cover misdemeanors so judges have comparable discretion over
them.
Second, because Minnesota's guidelines are presumptive, judges
have authority in every case not governed by a statutory mandatory
minimum, if they give reasons, to depart from recommended prison
sentences and impose a nonincarcerative sentence or a split sentence
in its place. Judges do this in about a third of the cases for which im-
prisonment is the presumptive sentence (Frase 1991, 1993), just as in a
smaller percentage of presumptive nonprison cases they impose prison
sentences. The bold black line is arbitrary, and there are inevitably
many cases falling in cells on either side of it that elicit judicial ambiva-
lence.
Third, judges and lawyers can negotiate sentences different from
those provided by guidelines. Sometimes this involves substitution of
a nonincarcerative penalty for a lengthy presumptive prison sentence
in a case in which there are no valid grounds for a departure (because,
for example, the state supreme court has expressly held those consider-
ations insufficient). Some people may see departures of this sort as in-
appropriate circumvention of guidelines-but both experience and re-
search instruct that it not uncommonly happens (Nagel and Schulhofer
1992). Although "illicit departures" are always possible, mention of
this special kind of interchangeability situation is not reiterated under
each of the following headings.
Most of the early presumptive guidelines systems gave judges com-
parable discretion over interchangeability decisions. In Oregon, as in
Minnesota, guidelines cover only felonies and 18-20 percent of con-
victed felons are sentenced to state prison (Mosbaek 1994, fig. 1).
Pennsylvania's guidelines cover misdemeanors, but as figure 4 (the Au-
gust 1991 version of Pennsylvania's guidelines grid) shows, both in-
carcerative and nonincarcerative punishments were authorized for
most misdemeanors and the less serious felonies, meaning that Penn-
sylvania judges had about the same authority to choose between incar-
ceration and nonincarceration as did Oregon and Minnesota judges.
b. Limited Interchangeability. The federal guidelines provide for
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very limited use of intermediate sanctions and for little interchange-
ability. Probation and prison are the only alternatives. Fines are not
authorized as sole penalties for individuals. Nor are intermediate sanc-
tions such as community service, house arrest, or intensive supervision
probation; these may be ordered only as conditions of probation. Fig-
ure 5 shows the federal grid in effect on November 1, 1993. It applied
to all federal felonies and misdemeanors. Confinement is authorized
for every offender. Only for the bottom eight (of forty-three) offense
levels (zone A), where sentencing ranges start at zero, did judges some-
times have complete discretion to choose between prison and proba-
tion (in 1993, only 13.7 percent of 34,642 cases on which the commis-
sion received complete guideline application information fell within
those eight levels: U.S. Sentencing Commission 1995, table 30). In lev-
els 9-10 (zone B), judges could sometimes substitute partial, commu-
nity, or home confinement on a day-for-day basis for total incarcera-
tion for a period not less than the minimum specified period. In levels
11-12 (zone C), some substitution was permitted, but at least half of
the guideline minimum had to be served in total confinement.2
Judges could also depart from the guidelines (though the permitted
grounds for departures are much narrower than in most state systems).
Even taking departures into account, in 1996 only 12 percent of sen-
tenced offenders received a probation sentence without a confinement
condition (U.S. Sentencing Commission 1997, fig. D). Another 7.2
percent received probation with a confinement condition.
c. Bounded Interchangeability. In most jurisdictions, the vast major-
ity of convicted felons and misdemeanants are not sentenced to state
prison. By the late 1980s, it was widely recognized that achievement
of sentencing reform goals required that nonincarcerative penalties be
brought within the scope of guidelines (e.g., Morris and Tonry 1990,
chaps. 1-3). This was equally evident whether the goals were idealistic
(reduce sentencing disparity, avoid unnecessary harshness) or manage-
rial (improve predictability and resource planning).
The first approach that received attention was to replace Minneso-
ta's and Washington's "in or out" approach, in which guidelines cells
either specified a range of authorized prison sentences or accorded the
judge complete authority to choose between confinement and noncon-
finement sentences, with a larger number of bounded choices.
2 The textual description applies to offenders in the lowest criminal history category;
as the lines defining zones A, B, and C show, for offenders with ampler criminal histo-
ries, judges had less discretion.
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense 1 11 1] IV V VIlevel (0 or I) (2 or 3) (4,5,6) (7,8,9) (10,11,12) (13 or more)
1 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
2 0-6 0-6 0-6 6 0 3-6 41-7
3 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 4 2-8 3-9
4 30-3 3-6 0-6 62-8 4-10 6-12
Zone A 5 0-6 0-6 1 1-6 4-10 7-96 9-15
6 0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
4 31-63 3-71 6-7 8-14 92-18 15-21
2 -56 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
9 4-10 6-12 87-108 12-18 18-24 21-27
Zone B
10 7-97 87-10 9-121810-76 15-21 21-27 24-30
11 8-14 10-16 12-18 18-24 24-30 8-233
ZoneC 12 10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
13 1-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
14 15-21 18-2 1-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
15 18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
16 21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
17 24-30 2733 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
18 27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-7I
19 30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 5-71 63-78
20 33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
21 37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
22 41-51t 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
23 46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
24 51-63 57-71 63-78 77-96 92-115 IOD-125
25 57-71 63-78 70-87 84-105 100-125 110-137
26 63-78 70-87 78-97 92-115 110-137 120-15027 70-87 78-97 87-108 IOD-125 120-150 130-162
Zone D
28' 78-97 87-108 97-121 110-137 130-162 14- 175
29 87-108 97-121 108-135 121-151 140-175 151-18830 97-121 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31 108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
33 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
34 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
35 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
36 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38 235-293 262-327 292-365 32.4-405 360-life 36-life
39 262-327 292-365 32.4-405 360-1ife 360-11re 360-life
40 292-365 324AOS0 360-life 360-life 360-fife 360-life
41 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-1ffe 360-life
42 360-life 360-1ife 360-1ife 360-life 360-1ife 360-life
43 life life life life life life
FIG. 5.-U.S. Sentencing Commission sentencing table (in months of imprisonment).
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission (1993).
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District of Columbia. The prototype was developed by the District
of Columbia Superior Court Sentencing Commission. Figure 6 shows
the proposed grid for unarmed offenses. It is divided into four zones.
For offenses falling in cells marked with an "a," the sentence is to be
served in the community (including probation, restitution, fines, com-
munity service). In "b" cells, the community sentences are presump-
tively appropriate, but incarceration may be ordered if the judge states
for the record the reason "why an alternative sentence has not been
selected." In "c" cells, both incarcerative and community sentences are
presumptively appropriate, and the judge may impose either without
being required to provide special justification. In the remaining cells,
the presumption is for imposition of a prison sentence from within a
narrow range of authorized sentence lengths; a community sentence
would be a departure and require that reasons be given in justification.
Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania in 1994 implemented revised guidelines
that adopted the District of Columbia approach. Figure 7 shows the
Pennsylvania guidelines for felonies and misdemeanors occurring on
or after August 12, 1994. They create four zones of discretion. Cells in
level I provide for "restorative sanctions," such as standard probation,
community service, and restitution.
Cells in level 2, although they vary in detail, in general authorize
judges to choose among restorative sanctions, "restrictive intermediate
punishments" (RIPs), and short jail terms. The RIPs involve full or
partial confinement (e.g., inpatient drug treatment, day-reporting cen-
ters, halfway houses) or intensive community penalties (e.g., house ar-
rest or intensive supervision probation with electronic monitoring). If
confinement is required, policy statements recommend a treatment
component. If only restorative sanctions or RIPs are authorized, policy
statements recommend restorative sanctions. Level 2 encompasses
many nonviolent crimes and some less serious violent crimes.
Cells in level 3 provide for total or partial confinement or for RIPs.
The guideline ranges for confinement set outer limits on RIP sentence
length. Judges are free to choose among the different kinds of punish-
ments. Policy statements encourage judges to consider restoration of
the victim or rehabilitation of the offender as primary goals and point
out that partial confinement coupled with work release and restitution
or inpatient drug treatment are authorized means to those goals.
Cells in level 4, which primarily apply to offenders convicted of ma-
jor violent or drug offenses, often with prior violent crime records,
Offense
Score
Criminal History Score
A 2 IC D E
0 1.51.5 123.5 4-5.5 16+
a a b c
1 6 6 6 9 15+
6-12
a 6 b c
2 6 6 9 12 18+
9-15
a b c
3 6 6 9 15 21+
6-12 12-18
b b c
4 9 9 12 18 24+
9-15 15-21
5 9 b 12 c 18 24 33+
9-15 15-21 18-30
6 12 18 24 30 42+
9-15 15-21 18-30 24-36
7 24 30 36 42 54+
18-30 24-36 30-42 36-48
8 36 42 48 54 66+
30-42 36-48 42-54 48-60
9 48 54 60 66 78+
42-54 48-60 54-66 60-72
10 72 78 84 90 102+
66-78 72-84 78-90 84-96
11 96 102 108 114 132+
84-108 90-114 96-120 102-126
FIG. 6.-Unarmed grid (time reported in months). ' The presumptive guideline sen-
tence for this offense would be served in the community. Along with probation, the
court might impose a fine, restitution, a requirement of community service, or a combi-
nation of these and other similar sanctions. The number shown is the longest minimum
sentence that would be imposed and suspended or imposed after revocation on the basis
of noncompliance with the conditions of the community-based sentence. b At the discre-
tion of the judge, a community sentence (as defined above) or an incarcerative sentence
may be imposed; the number shown is the longest minimum sentence that may be im-
posed if the initial sentence is one of incarceration or the longest minimum sentence
that would be imposed if a community sentence is initially imposed and later revoked.
Before imposing sentence, the judge shall consider alternatives to incarceration (i.e., in-
tensive probation supervision and other highly structured supervision programs) for
cases in this cell. If an incarcerative sentence is imposed, the judge is required to state
on the record why an alternative sentence has not been selected. I Before imposing a
sentence, the judge may consider alternatives to incarceration for cases in this cell pro-
vided that the conviction offense does not involve use of a gun (including assault with a
deadly weapon) or injury to a victim and the offender was not on probation or parole at
the time of the offense. Source: D.C. Superior Court, Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion (1987).
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KEY'
AGG = aggravated sentence addition
INCAR = incarceration
MIT = mitigated sentence subtraction
RFEL = repeat felony I and felony 11
offender category
RIP = restrictive intermediate punishments
RS = restorative sanctions
111/2 = denotes county sentence of less
than 12 months
2. Levels 1, 2, and 3 of the matrix indicate
restrictive intermediate punishments may
be imposed as a substitute for incarceration.
3. When restrictive intermediate punishments
are appropriate, the duration of the restrictive
intermediate punishment program shall not
exceed the guideline ranges.
4. When the range is RS through a number
of months (e.g., RS'6), RIP may be
appropriate.
NOTES:
5. When RIP is the upper limit of the sentence
I. When the offender meets the statutory criteria recommendation (e.g., RS-RIP), the length
for boot camp participation, the court should of the restrictive intermediate punishment
consider authorizing the offender as eligible. programs shall not exceed 30 days.
FIG. 7.-Pennsylvania guideline, August 12, 1994, standard ranges. Source: Pennsyl-
vania Commission on Sentencing (1994).
provide for presumptive minimum prison terms to be served before pa-
role eligibility.
Compared with the federal guidelines, Pennsylvania continues to
delegate substantial discretion to the sentencing judge over the choice
of sentence and allow a much greater scope for nonconfinement sen-
tences. Figure 8 shows how Pennsylvania offenders sentenced in 1992
Offense Prior Record Score
Gravity AGG/
Level Score 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL MIr
13 60-120 66-120 72-120 78-120 84-120 90-120 96-120 ±12
Level 12 54-72 57-75 60-78 66-84 72-90 78-96 84-102 ±12
4
Incar 11 42-60 45-63 48-66 54-72 60-78 66-84 72-96 ± 12
10 30-48 33-51 36-54 42-60 48-66 54-72 60-84 ±12
Level 9 8-20 12-27 15-30 21-36 27-42 33-48 39-60 ±63
jj 8 6-18 9-21 12-24 18-30 24-36 30-42 36-48 ±6
Cnty--
Jail/ 7 4-12 7-15 10-18 16-24 22-30 28-36 34-42 ±6
RIP
6 3-9 6-111/2 9-15 12-18 15-21 18-24 21-27 ±3
Level 5 RS-6 1-6 3-9 6-111/2 9-15 12-18 15-21 ±32
Incar 4 RS-3 RS-6 RS-9 3-9 6-111/2 9-15 12-18 ±3
RIP
RS 3 RS-RIP RS-3 RS-6 RS-9 , 3-9 6-111/2 9-15 ±3
Level 2 RS RS RS-RIP RS-3 RS-6 1-6 3-9 ± 3
RS 1 RS RS RS-RIP RS-RIP RS-3 RS-6 RS-6 ±3
Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines
9 18 12 7
23 67
12 18
111 181
84 115
Offense
Gravity Prior Record Score
Score 0 1 2 3 4 5 RFEL Totals
148 14 21
1 - -
620 45 92
252 20 32
0 190 302
2590 3808 1386 1944 1916 2116
229
1
948
362
2809
2069
455
4067
6263
1611
12130
5142
3731
39817
Note: RFEL = repeat felony I and felony II offender category.
= 5,212 offenders in imprisonment cells
= 10,465 offenders in imprisonment/restrictive intermediate punishment ("RIP") cells
M= 17,261 offenders in restorative sanctions/RIP/short jail term cells
M= O.87 offenders in restorative sanctions cells
39,817 total offenders
FIG. 8.-1992 sentenced Pennsylvania offenders redistributed among cells in August
12, 1994, grid. Source: Data provided by Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing
(1994).
would have been distributed among the cells in the 1994 guidelines
grid, had it then existed. The four level 1 cells, which authorize only
restorative sanctions and preclude any confinement, govern sentencing
of 6,879 offenders, 17 percent of the total. The sixteen level 2 cells, all
of which authorize restorative sanctions or RIPs, and some of which
also authorize confinement of three or six months, govern sentencing
of 17,261 offenders, 43 percent of the total. Of these, 8,944 (23 per-
Totals 26057
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cent) fall into cells in which only restorative sanctions or RIPs are au-
thorized. Only 5,512 offenders, 13 percent, fall within level 4 cells in
which total confinement is the only presumptively appropriate sen-
tence.
Compared with the federal guidelines, Pennsylvania's mechanically
simpler guidelines represent a more complex philosophy of sentencing.
Confinement is not the only punishment available for most offenders.
Judges have substantial discretion to choose among different kinds of
punishments. Even within a single level, judges may individualize sen-
tences depending on how they weigh restorative, rehabilitative, and re-
tributive considerations.
North Carolina. North Carolina is the first state to attempt from
the outset to include in its guidelines standards for felonies and misde-
meanors and for incarcerative and nonincarcerative punishments.
Pennsylvania got there, but thirteen years after its initial guidelines
took effect. The North Carolina guidelines took effect October 1,
1994.
North Carolina's guidelines have surface similarity to Pennsylvania's
but are more different than may at first appear. Figure 9 shows the grid
for felony sentencing. As in Pennsylvania, three ranges of presumptive
lengths of prison sentences are shown-standard, mitigated, and ag-
gravated. Also as in Pennsylvania, interchangeability is provided by use
of a zones of discretion approach.
In other ways they are substantially different. Pennsylvania's guide-
lines set minimum parole eligibility dates; North Carolina abolished
parole release and good time; guidelines thus prescribe time-to-be-
served. More importantly, North Carolina's guidelines are much more
restrictive of judicial discretion. A Pennsylvania judge who departs
from the guidelines need only "provide a contemporaneous written
statement of the reason or reasons." There is no general evidentiary
test that must be met and appellate courts tend to use a deferential
"abuse of discretion" standard in considering sentencing appeals.
In North Carolina, if the guidelines specify a prison sentence, judges
must set a term from within the authorized range unless, for less seri-
ous cases, the court finds "that extraordinary mitigating factors of a
kind greater than the normal case exist and that they substantially out-
weigh any factors in aggravation." In addition, the court must also find
that imposition of a prison sentence would be a "manifest injustice."
Even then, the possibility of an intermediate punishment is forbidden
Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines
PRIOR RECORD LEVEL
OPs 1-4Pt 5-IPt. 9-14 Pts 15-189s I 19+Pts
A Death or Life Without Parole
A A A A A A Disposition
240-300 288.360 336-420 384-480 Lfe Without LfWt Aggravated RangeB1 192-240 230-288 269-336 307-384 346-433 384-480 PRESUMPTIVE RANGE
144-192 173-230 202-269 23o-307 260-346 288.3&4 Mitigated Range
FIG. 9.-North Carolina felony punishment chart, 1994 (numbers shown are in
months). A = active punishment; I = intermediate punishment; C = community punish-
ment. Source: North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory Commission (1994a).
for all drug traffickers, offenders convicted of murder or first-degree
rape, and offenders with any significant prior record.
North Carolina recognizes three types of sentences: "active punish-
ments" (immediate total confinement), "intermediate punishments"
(split sentences, residential programs, electronic house arrest, and in-
tensive supervision probation), and "community punishments" (super-
vised or unsupervised probation, community service, outpatient treat-
ment programs, fines). Figure 9 has two principal bands-active
A A A A A A
63-79 86-108 100-125 115.144 130-162 145,181
C 50-63 69-86 80-100 92-115 104-130 116-145
38-50 52-69 60-80 69-92 78-104 87.116
A A A A A A
55-69 66-82 89-111 101-126 115-144 126.158
D 44-55 53-66 71-89 81-101 92-115 101-126
33-44 40-53 53-71 61-81 69-92 76-101
I/A I/A A A A A
25-31 29.36 34-42 46-58 53-66 59.74
E 20-25 23-29 27-34 37-46 42-53 47-59
15-20 17-23 20-27 28-37 32-42 35-47
I/A I/A I/A A A A
16-20 19-24 21-26 25-31 34-42 39.49
F 13-16 15-19 17-21 20-25 27-34 31-39
10-13 11-15 13-17 15-20 20-27 23-31
I/A I/A I/A I/A A A
13-16 15-19 16-20 20-25 21-26 29-36
G 10-13 12-15 13-16 16-20 17-21 23-29
8-10 9.12 10-13 12-16 13-17 17,23
C/I I I/A I/A I/A A
6-8 8-10 10-12 11-14 15-19 20,25
H 5-6 6-8 8-10 9-11 12-15 16-20
4-5 4-6 6-8 7-9 9-12 12-16
C C/I I I/A I/A I/A
1 6-8 6-8 6-8 8-10 9-11 10-12
4-6 4-6 5-6 6-8 7-9 8-10
3-4 3-4 4-5 4-6 5-7 6-8
A
135-169
108-135
81-108
A
163-204
130-163
98-130
A
190-238
152-190
114-152
A
216-270
173-216
130-173
A
243-304
194-243
146-194
A
270-338
216-270
162-216
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punishments ("A" cells) or either active or intermediate punishments
("I/A" cells). In addition, two cells authorize only intermediate pun-
ishments, two authorize intermediate or community punishments, and
one authorizes only community punishments.
At first impression, it may appear that North Carolina's guidelines
are more restrictive of the use of community punishments than are
Pennsylvania's, just as North Carolina's prison guidelines are more re-
strictive of judicial discretion than are Pennsylvania's. That impression
may be misleading. Pennsylvania's grid includes felonies and misde-
meanors. North Carolina's applies only to felonies; a second grid (fig.
10) sets the guidelines' rules for misdemeanors. It authorizes commu-
nity punishments for all misdemeanors and authorizes intermediate
and active punishments for some. Precisely how the two states' policies
compare in relation to the restrictions they impose on judicial discre-
tion can be determined only by analysis of data showing precisely
which crimes appear in each cell of each grid and how many offenders
are affected by each cell.
The choice between separate and combined grids for felonies and
misdemeanors raises at least two significant considerations. First, it
could be argued that misdemeanors are typically less serious crimes
and that the offense itself should be the principal sentencing consider-
ation. Thus North Carolina has only three criminal history categories
for misdemeanors but six for felonies and authorizes community penal-
ties for all misdemeanors. Pennsylvania's seven criminal history cate-
gories might be seen as overkill.
Second, however, Pennsylvania's approach permits policy makers to
look behind statutory offense classes and to distinguish among misde-
meanors depending on the behavior they involve. Thus while most
Pennsylvania misdemeanors (there are three statutory classes) are in-
cluded in the bottom three of Pennsylvania's thirteen offense-severity
levels, some involving firearms, drugs, and offenses against children
were placed in levels 4 and 5. Misdemeanor manslaughters involving
driving under the influence (DUI) convictions were placed in levels 7
and 8, and providing weapons to an inmate was placed in level 9.
There is as yet no literature that shows how the different approaches
described in this section work in practice, although the National Insti-
tute of Justice in 1996 and 1997 awarded a number of grants for evalu-
ation of new guidelines systems. The D.C. Superior Court guidelines
were never implemented, and the absence of policy concerning inter-
Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines
Prior Conviction Levels
I L II
Class 
HH_
No Prior One to Four Five or More
Convictions Prior Convictions Prior Convictions
1 - 45 days 1 - 45 days I - 120 days
C C/I/A C/I/A
21 - 30 days I - 45 days I - 60 days
C C/I C/I/A
3 - 10 days I - 15 days I -20 days
C C/I C/I/A
FIG. 10.-North Carolina misdemeanor punishment chart, 1994. A = active punish-
ment; I = intermediate punishment; C = community punishment. Cells with slashes
allow either disposition at the discretion of the judge. Source: North Carolina Sentenc-
ing and Policy Advisory Commission (1994b).
mediate sanctions in most states has meant that the small sentencing
reform evaluation literature has little to say on the subject.
2. Substitution of Penalties. Two other related approaches for set-
ting policies governing substitution of incarcerative and nonincarcera-
tive punishments have been tried. The first is to develop a generic
common currency, typically called punishment units or custody units,
into which all punishments can be exchanged. This approach was dis-
cussed extensively during the development phase of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission's work (Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 2), but only in
Oregon has it been implemented in part. Louisiana included a punish-
ment unit approach in its voluntary guidelines, but they were repealed
in 1995.
The second approach is to set specific exchange rates between differ-
ent kinds of penalties. No jurisdiction has developed a complete
scheme. Day fines were introduced in Germany in the early 1970s to
serve as a substitute for prison sentences up to six months (Weigend
1995, 1997). Community service orders were introduced in England
and Wales (Pease 1985), Scotland (Mclvor 1995), and the Netherlands
(Tak 1997), also as substitutes for prison sentences up to six months.
Oregon and Washington initially established exchange rates of two or
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three days' community service for one day's confinement. New York
City's community service program was designed to require seventy
hours community service as a substitute for six months in jail (McDon-
ald 1986).
a. Punishment Units. The idea is to create generic "punishment
units" into which all sanctions can be converted. A hypothetical system
might provide, for example, for the following conversion values:
* One year's confinement 100 units
* One year's partial confinement 50 units
* One year's house arrest 50 units
* One year's standard probation 20 units
* 25 days' community service 50 units
* 30 days' intensive supervision 5 units
* 90 days' income (day fines) 100 units
* 30 days' electronic monitoring 5 units
That is by no means a complete list; such things as drug testing, treat-
ment conditions, and restitution might or might not be added. The
values could be divided or multiplied to obtain values for other periods
(e.g., 75 days' confinement equals 20 units).
If guidelines, for example, set 120 punishment units as the presump-
tive sentence for a particular offender, a judge could impose any com-
bination of sanctions that represented 120 units. One year's confine-
ment (100 units) plus 60 subsequent days' intensive supervision (10
units) on electronic monitoring (10 units) would be appropriate. So
would a 90-unit day fine (100 units) plus one year's standard probation
(20 units). So would 25 days' community service (50 units) and six
months' intensive supervision (30 units), followed by two years' stan-
dard probation (40 units).
Oregon's guidelines have since their initial promulgation incorpo-
rated "sanction units" (originally "custody units") in relation to non-
prison sentences. Figure 11 shows the 1993 version. The cells above
the bold black line contain two numbers and create a presumption that
confinement is the appropriate sentence for cases falling within that
cell; the numbers are the upper and lower limits in months of the range
of presumptive sentences. Cases falling within cells below the bold
black line also contain two numbers, these are presumptive local sanc-
tion cases: the bottom number is the maximum jail term, in sanction
units (days), that can be imposed without a departure; the top number
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Criminal History Scale
A B C D E F 0 H I
Murder 11 225- 196- 178- 149- 149- 135- 129- 122- 120-
269 224 194 177 177 148 134 128 121
bta-lauotl 1 . Asmult I. 10 121- 116- 1- 91- 81- 71- 66- 61- 58-
Rape 1. A I 130 120 115 110 90 80 70 65 60
Rape I. A lt 1. KidnappingI. 9 66- 61- 56- 51- 46- 41- 39- 37- 34-
AroI. Durgar I. Robb"y I 72 65 60 55 50 45 40 38 36
Manslaugbte, It. S-a Abuse I. A-aodt U.
Rapo It. U" Child n Display oS1 8 41- 35- 29- 27- 25- 23- 21- 19 16-
Conduct. Drug-MIor. Cult/Maonu./Dl.. 49 40 34 28 26 24 22 20 18
Coeop,. ProetuUon. Neg. Homidde
ot -t. Coer/oo. Supplyingtt Coorband. 31- 25- 21- 19- 16- 180 180 180 1809 -pe E 7 36 30 24 20 18 90 90 90 90
RobberyU A-ult M. I14pe in. Barbe 25- 19- 15- 13- 10- 180 180 180 180
Rectli, '1tuteWtI-. Pr-PeryC11ro ane 164 1 4 19
(ethao 850.000). Drug P ..elon 30 24 18 14 12 90 90 90 90
Robbery M. Theft by Recervtng. 15- 13- I- 9- 6- 180 120 120 120
pt Traffickng - 9.99o9oV ,5 16 14 12 10 8 90 60 60 60
Wa to A r . Custodial Interfoe U. 10- 8- 120 120 120 120 120 120 120property crtm- ($5.000 - 89.999). 4 10 9 0 60 0 so 0 so 0CWL8anuf./D.l 10 9 6   6  60 6 60 6
Ab oso Child. Ab-c of Corpse. 120 120 120 120 120 120 90 90 90
C rinim e.l No -ppo$. 3 60 60 60 60 60 60 30 30 30
Property Cdmoo ($1.000 -94.9991
Deaing Child Porography, Vilatio of 90 90 90 90 80 90 90 90 90
Property C rtm e Prud 6O2 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Property Crtomoo 5(o than 01.O00)
Alterig Fitm ID. Habtul Offender 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
Vlo ,t oo. BgmOy. Paftl A&Mty. 1 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
FIG. 1L-Oregon sentencing guidelines grid, 1993. Numbers in cells above black line
are presumptive maximum and minimum prison sentences (in months). Below the black
line, upper number is the added nonjail custody units; lower number is the maximum
number of jail days that may be imposed. Source: Oregon Criminal Justice Council
(1993).
is the presumptive maximum number of applicable sanction units that
can be imposed in lieu of jail (including penalties following revoca-
tions). The maximum number of authorized sanction units increases
from 90 to 120 to 180 as crime seriousness or criminal history increase.
One day in jail, inpatient treatment, partial confinement, or house ar-
rest equals one sanction unit, as does sixteen hours of community ser-
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vice. Sanction units not used as part of a jail term remain available for
use in order to punish violations of probation conditions.
Oregon's sanctions-unit scheme bears no relation to the hypotheti-
cal scheme described above. No values are attached to intensive super-
vision, fixed fines and day fines, restitution, outpatient drug or sex of-
fender treatment, or electronic monitoring. All of the sanctions
affected by it, but community service, are forms of custody and for
them a day equals a day equals a day, and there is little that is novel in
such a scheme. Prison administrators have long had the authority to
assign prisoners to institutions with different levels of control, includ-
ing prisons of different custody levels, halfway houses, and house ar-
rest. No sanctions-unit scheme is required to express that equivalence.
The sixteen hours' community service equals a day of confinement pol-
icy could be expressed in a simple one sentence statement. Oregon's
sanctions-unit scheme does provide a system for limiting the scope of
back-up penalties attached to condition violations, but this too could
be done simply by stating the maximum number of days such penalties
can involve.
There are probably two reasons why Oregon's scheme is so limited
in scope. First, many people start from the idea that confinement is the
basic form of punishment and that any other "equivalent" sanction
must be equally burdensome. Thus, many people would be uneasy
with a system that treated one year's imprisonment as equivalent to
thirty days' community service or a fine equal to ninety days' income.
Second, if conditions like house arrest, drug testing, electronic moni-
toring, and community service are given unit values, the resulting com-
binations of numbers seem arbitrary. After the Pennsylvania commis-
sion failed to work out the details of such a scheme in 1994, it was
abandoned as unworkable.
b. Exchange Rates. Another approach is simply to specify equiva-
lent custodial and noncustodial penalties and to authorize judges to im-
pose them in the alternative. Washington's commission did this
(Boerner 1985) and later proposed a more extensive system (Washing-
ton State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1992, pp. 19-23), which
the legislature did not adopt. Partial confinement and community ser-
vice were initially authorized as substitutes for presumptive prison
terms on the bases of one day's partial confinement or three day's com-
munity service for one day of total confinement.
Like the punishment unit proposals, the equivalency approaches
have also so far been unable to overcome the psychological and politi-
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cal pressures to make "equivalent" punishments as objectively burden-
some as prison, which limits their use to the most minor offenses and
offenders. Washington's three-days'-community-service-equals-one-
day's-confinement policy would permit community service in place of
from three to ten days' confinement if existing successful programs
were used as models.
The difficulty is that community service programs, to be credible,
must be enforced, and experience in this country and elsewhere in-
structs that they must be short. That is why the best-known American
program in Staten Island, New York (McDonald 1986) set seventy
hours as a standard and the national policies in England and Wales,
Scotland, and the Netherlands set 240 hours as the upper limit. A sys-
tem like New York's seventy-hours' community service in place of six
months' jail can be justified (the idea was to give repetitive property
offenders some meaningful enforced penalty rather than impose an ex-
pensive jail term that no one expected would have deterrent effects),
but it requires a loosening of punitive literalism that no sentencing
commission has been prepared to accept.
3. Categorical Exceptions. Categorical exception policies, focusing
not on the sanction but on the offender, are permissive. They autho-
rize, but do not direct, judges to disregard otherwise applicable sen-
tencing ranges if offenders meet specified criteria. One example is a
federal guidelines provision (Rule 5.K. 1) that empowers judges to de-
part from guidelines if the prosecution files a motion proposing such a
departure on the rationale that the defendant has provided "substantial
assistance [to the government] in the investigation or prosecution of
another person." Once the motion is made, the judge is free from
guidelines presumptions about appropriate sentences. This is an enor-
mously significant escape hatch from the federal guidelines because it
mostly benefits offenders convicted of serious multiparty offenses and
because it affects large numbers of cases. Of all federal sentences in
fiscal year 1996, 21.7 percent were downward substantial assistance de-
partures, including 35 percent of all drug trafficking sentences (U.S.
Sentencing Commission 1997, table 27).
Only one state, Washington, has developed extensive categorical ex-
ception policies. Under the First-time Offender Waiver, judges may
disregard otherwise applicable guidelines in sentencing qualifying of-
fenders and "the court is given broad discretion in setting the sen-
tence" (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1994a,
p. 1-18). Available alternatives include up to 90 days' jail or two years'
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probation and financial penalties, compulsory treatment, and commu-
nity service. To be eligible, the offense must be a first conviction for
a nonviolent, nonsexual offense (some drug offenders are also ineligi-
ble). In 1993, 2,139 offenders (of 7,224 eligible) were sentenced under
the first offender exception (Washington State Sentencing Guidelines
Commission 1994a, pp. 1-18-1-19).
Washington's special sex offender sentencing alternative authorizes
judges to suspend prison sentences for most first-time sex offenders
(Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 1994b, pp. I-
19-1-21). To qualify, the offender must agree to two examinations by
certified sex offender treatment specialists and to preparation of a
treatment plan. Following a decision that the offender is amenable to
treatment, the judge may suspend the presumptive sentence and im-
pose a community sentence that includes sex offender treatment, up to
ninety days in jail, community supervision, various financial obliga-
tions, and community service. In 1993, of 940 eligible offenders, 400
received special sex offender departures (Washington State Sentencing
Guidelines Commission 1994a, p. 18).
No other state has attained as much experience with use of categori-
cal exceptions to sentencing guidelines (Washington also has a "work
ethic [boot] camp" program that permits substitution of four to six
months' boot camp for twenty-two to thirty-six months in prison).
The idea, however, has potentially broad application to guidelines
systems.
4. Delaware's Voluntary Continuum of Sanctions. Delaware is a spe-
cial case. In some ways, its approach does not fit into this discussion.
Here the emphasis is on presumptive guidelines that attempt to struc-
ture sentencing discretion. Delaware's guidelines are voluntary and
judges are as free to ignore as to follow them. The guidelines lack legal
authority and no one may appeal if a judge ignores them.
However, Delaware in the mid-1980s became the first state explic-
itly to incorporate nonprison sanctions into its sentencing policies and
more recently adopted "truth-in-sentencing" when it abolished parole
release. The chairman of Delaware's Sentencing Accountability Com-
mission (SENTAC) has published articles presenting data that suggest
that the guidelines have increased use of intermediate sanctions and
achieved greater consistency and predictability in sentencing (e.g.,
Gebelein 1996).
Delaware Supreme Court rules provide standards for sentences for
typical instances of specific offenses. Sentences are increased or de-
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creased to take account of aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
SENTAC has identified. Judges are required to give statements of rea-
sons on the record for sentences that deviate from the standards. The
adequacy or persuasiveness of those reasons, however, cannot be ap-
pealed to higher courts.
Delaware's Sentencing Accountability Commission drafted the sen-
tencing standards and also devised a five-level continuum of punish-
ments that judges incorporate in their sentences: "Level V" (imprison-
ment), "Level IV" (house arrest or residential treatment programs),
"Level MI" (intensive supervision), "Level 11" (standard probation),
and "Level I" (unsupervised probation).
Judges can use the sanction levels in three ways. First, sentences are
sometimes expressed in terms of X months at Level V, followed by Y
months at Level III, and Z months at Level II. Second, judges use the
levels as a way to provide measured responses to condition violations.
Judges need not choose between ignoring a violation and sending the
offender to jail or prison. A Level II offender who violates conditions
can be sanctioned by a control upgrade to Level III or Level IV. Third,
an offender who is doing well can be rewarded by a downgrade. A
Level I offender who is performing conscientiously may have his or
her control status reduced to Level II.
Little has been written about Delaware's guidelines and no evalua-
tions have been published. The crucial and in the absence of an evalua-
tion unanswerable question is how they are used by Delaware judges,
including whether they achieve greater use of intermediate sanctions
and better or worse consistency in sentencing than elsewhere.
C. Interchangeability among Nonincarcerative Punishments
No jurisdiction to my knowledge has devoted significant attention
to alternate ways to structure or guide judicial discretion over choices
among different nonincarcerative punishments. The North Carolina
and Pennsylvania zones of discretion distinguish among "community"
(North Carolina) or "restorative" sanctions (Pennsylvania) like stan-
dard probation, community service, and fines, and more restrictive
sanctions like house arrest and intensive supervision. Both states'
guidelines contain a few cells in which only community or restorative
sanctions are authorized. Within any zone of discretion, however,
judges receive little guidance for their decisions among authorized
nonincarcerative sanctions. Pennsylvania commentary urges judges to
take rehabilitative considerations into account in fashioning nonprison
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sentences, and North Carolina commentary suggests (and implicitly
recommends) normal durations for various nonprison sanctions.
Each of the methods for integrating intermediate sanctions into sen-
tencing guidelines previously discussed could be adapted to govern
such choices. As figures 1 and 2 illustrated, for example, many more
zones of discretion could be established that would relate particular
kinds of nonincarcerative sanctions to differences in offense severity.
Table 1 shows a ten-category punishment classification that Delaware
considered (but rejected) in the early 1980s that could have been used
in that way. Delaware's current five punishment levels provide a sim-
pler approach. Or, combining the exchange-rate and categorical excep-
tions approaches, exchange rates could be developed for many more
kinds of sanctions, and policy statements could specify the kinds of of-
fenses or offenders to which particular sanctions apply. Thus, rules
might provide that property offenders should ordinarily receive finan-
cial penalties or community service, drug-dependent offenders should
ordinarily receive intensive supervision coupled with drug treatment
conditions, and all moderately serious violent offenders should ordi-
narily receive partial or intermittent confinement with restitution or
treatment conditions as appropriate.
No jurisdiction, however, has done any of those things. Except for
the few cells in the North Carolina and Pennsylvania grids that pre-
clude both restrictive intermediate punishments and confinement and
limits, as in Oregon, on the duration of community confinement sen-
tences (like house arrest, partial confinement, or day-reporting cen-
ters), once systems authorize judges to impose a nonconfinement sen-
tence, judges have wide unguided discretion to choose.
D. Authority
The question here concerns the nature and weight of the legal pre-
sumptions concerning choices between incarcerative and nonincarcer-
ative punishments and among nonincarcerative punishments. Judges
typically have wide, unregulated discretion concerning both choices,
with the exception that in systems like Pennsylvania's and North Caro-
lina's that adopted a zones of discretion approach, a sentence to a ge-
neric type of sanction more severe than is authorized by the band is a
departure that requires reasons. Thus in the four cells in Pennsylva-
nia's guidelines, and the one cell in North Carolina's felony guidelines,
that specify only restorative or community punishments, intermediate
or incarcerative sentences are presumptively inappropriate.
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The distinctions between voluntary and presumptive guidelines, and
among the latter between those that are restrictive and those that are
flexible, are important in relation to imprisonment sanctions. They are
nearly irrelevant in relation to nonimprisonment sanctions. Within the
(usually broad) range of sanctions permitted in any cell, judges in every
system have complete discretion to choose among them. This is so
concerning choices between prison and nonprison penalties and
among nonprison penalties. In North Carolina, for example, for cases
falling into the intermediate punishments zone of the grid, judges may
impose any combination of the authorized punishments, for any dura-
tion up to five years, and may in addition impose any combination of
the lesser punishments included within the community punishments
category. No reasons need be given and no appeal is available.
The scope of legal authority to sentencers is potentially different in
"zone of discretion" and "penalty units" systems. In Oregon, for ex-
ample, one function that is served by the penalty units system for non-
state-prison sentences is to limit the defendant's maximum vulnerabil-
ity to punishment, even in relation to back-up sanctions for breaches
of technical conditions. Because the Pennsylvania and North Carolina
systems do not limit judges' choices among nonincarcerative sentences,
there are few limits on offenders' vulnerability. In cell H of North Car-
olina's grid, for example, a judge could impose twelve months of unsu-
pervised probation on one offender and a five-year term of probation
including six months in jail (as part of a split sentence), residential drug
treatment, intensive supervision with electronic monitoring, a fine, res-
titution, and community service on another.
A different way to make this point is to observe that reduction in
disparities in prison sentences is a major goal of many guidelines sys-
tems but that few efforts are typically made to reduce or avoid dispari-
ties in nonprison sentences. There are various ways that policy makers
could try to reduce disparities among nonprison sentences. To date,
few attempts have been made to do so.
II. Problems and Prospects
The task of incorporating intermediate sanctions into sentencing
guidelines is in the late 1990s at about the same stage that sentencing
guidelines were at in the early 1980s. The need to devise means to
structure judicial discretion was widely recognized and a few states, no-
tably Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington, had adopted policies
aimed at doing so. Today, the need to incorporate intermediate sanc-
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tions into guidelines is widely recognized and a few states, notably
North Carolina and Pennsylvania, have attempted to do so.
Some of those methods for incorporating intermediate sanctions
into guidelines are promising and warrant further development. Oth-
ers appear to be at dead ends. Still other possible ways to structure
judicial discretion concerning intermediate sanctions deserve consider-
ation.
Among the goals of comprehensive guidelines systems are to achieve
consistency in sentencing; to avoid racial, gender, and other unwar-
ranted disparities; and to generate flows and types of offenders who
can be accommodated in existing and planned corrections programs,
both institutional and community based. The first two of those goals
are shared by every existing guidelines system, though the degree to
which they are realized varies.
The third goal, tying policies to resources, is sought in relation to
prison beds by those states that have adopted "resource constraint"
policies (see M. Tonry 1996, chap. 2). Some states, including Minne-
sota, Washington, Oregon, and Kansas, have been markedly successful
for extended periods.
Movement toward realization of the three goals in relation to inter-
mediate sanctions is the subject of this essay. If improved consis-
tency and reduced disparities are to be achieved, sentencing rules
must be established to which sentences imposed can be compared.
If policy is to be tied to resources, sentencing must be made predict-
able.
By those criteria, progress toward incorporation of intermediate
sanctions into guidelines has been slight. Even in North Carolina and
Pennsylvania, no rules govern choices among intermediate sanctions
or, in the portions of their guidelines grids in which both confinement
and intermediate sanctions are options, between them. In the long
term, some mechanisms must be developed that will set policies gov-
erning those choices. Much of the discussion below of how that can be
done is speculative and exploratory since it extrapolates from, rather
than documents, relevant experience.
A. Building on the Past
Section I describes the four approaches so far taken for incorporat-
ing intermediate sanctions in sentencing guidelines-zones of discre-
tion, punishment units, exchange rates, and categorical exceptions.
This section suggests ways those initiatives can be extended.
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1. Zones of Discretion. Zones of discretion, adopted in North Caro-
lina and Pennsylvania, offer the broadest promise. By defining various
offense/offender combinations for which only confinement, an inter-
mediate sanction, or a community penalty is presumptively appro-
priate, they make some proportionality and predictability in the use of
various sanctions more likely. However, because they set no presump-
tions governing choices among intermediate sanctions or between in-
termediate sanctions and confinement, such sentencing decisions must
be made in a policy vacuum. That vacuum can be filled.
Zones of discretion are likely to be adopted in most guidelines sys-
tems that attempt to take account of intermediate sanctions. If ways
can be devised to establish policies governing choices between con-
finement and intermediate sanctions, and among intermediate sanc-
tions, zones of discretion will provide the context within which those
policies can operate.
North Carolina and Pennsylvania have taken small steps to provide
guidance concerning choices among intermediate sanctions. North
Carolina's Training and Reference Manual (North Carolina Sentenc-
ing and Policy Advisory Committee 1994a, pp. 29-30), although it
neither creates dispositional presumptions nor makes recommenda-
tions, provides information on typical durations of intermediate sanc-
tions. For example, "The current average length of electronic moni-
toring is ninety days or less" and "the current average length of
intensive probation is from six to nine months." The rationales pre-
sumably are that such information will help judges decide what dura-
tion to impose and that judges will be inclined to follow those conven-
tions.
Pennsylvania, likewise, provides information to judges that may be
intended to influence their decisions. Pennsylvania's guidelines manual
(Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing 1994, pp. 6-7) reminds
judges that, in selecting among confinement and restrictive intermedi-
ate sanctions in zone 3 (prison or a restrictive intermediate sanction),
they "may choose to place the primary focus of the sentence on treat-
ment of the offender by placing the offender in an inpatient treatment
facility." In slightly less neutral language, the manual suggests that
judges "should consider" sentences to boot camp or drug or alcohol
treatment for qualifying offenders in zone 2.
2. Punishment Units. At least in the 1990s, the punishment units
approach does not appear to have broad relevance. Oregon is the pio-
neer and progress has been slight with prison equivalences having been
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established only for partial confinement and community service. Ore-
gon uses punishment units in a second way, however, that may have
broader relevance. Sanction units not used as part of a jail term remain
available for use to punish violations of probation conditions. In effect,
punishment units can operate as aggregate limits on "back-up" sanc-
tions that can be imposed for breach of conditions of the initial pen-
alty. In many courts, judges sentence offenders who have breached
conditions of a community penalty to jail or state prison as a penalty.
When the breach is of a technical condition such as prohibitions on
alcohol or drug use or violation of curfews, imprisonment may be dis-
proportionately severe and, from a cost-benefit perspective, dispropor-
tionately costly. Use of punishment units to constrain use of back-up
sanctions is a way to control both excesses.
The core idea-establishment of guidelines for back-up sanctions
proportioned to the seriousness of the original crime-has, however,
no inherent link with punishment units. That general idea is developed
further below.
3. Exchange Rates. Exchange rates are but a simpler version of a
punishment units approach, and at least in the 1990s are no likelier to
be broadly useful. Rather than establish some generic currency into
which all sanctions can be converted, and then exchanged, exchange
rates directly identify equivalent punishments. In Washington's initial
guidelines, for example, one day's confinement was made exchangeable
for one day's partial confinement or three days' community service, but
they do not take account of such common penalties as fines, restitu-
tion, and intensive supervision. For so long as prevailing views require
that imprisonment be considered the normal punishment and that sub-
stitutes for imprisonment be comparably burdensome and intrusive,
exchange rates are unlikely to play a significant role in sentencing
guidelines.
4. Categorical Exceptions. Categorical exceptions, both permissive
and presumptive, have a role to play in incorporation of intermediate
sanctions into sentencing guidelines. Permissive exceptions are like
Washington's special sex offender sentencing alternative: they autho-
rize but do not direct the judge to set aside the normally presumptive
range of sentences for a specific category of offenders. In effect, they
operate as trumps that the judge may decide whether and when to use.
Washington judges often assert their authority over permissive excep-
tions to craft individualized sentences for sexual offenders and first-
time offenders.
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Presumptive exceptions indicate that defined categories should ordi-
narily be handled in a particular way. The Federal Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, for example, in Section 9940) provided that the federal
guidelines shall "reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sen-
tence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a
first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an
otherwise serious offense." The U.S. Sentencing Commission could
have reiterated that precise language in its guidelines (it did not: M.
Tonry 1996, chap. 3); had it done so, federal judges would have oper-
ated under a presumption that some sentence other than imprisonment
was appropriate for most first offenders.
Both permissive and presumptive exceptions can potentially be use-
ful in incorporating intermediate sanctions into sentencing guidelines.
B. Looking to the Future
This final section looks to the future and offers more speculative
suggestions that policy makers might consider as they continue their
efforts to build intermediate sanctions into sentencing guidelines.
Zones of discretion and categorical exceptions have roles to play in
integrating intermediate sanctions and guidelines policies. Use of
zones of discretion has permitted policy makers to specify categories
of offenses and offenders for which only particular kinds of sanctions
are presumptively appropriate, but little guidance has as yet been pro-
vided for choosing between imprisonment and other sanctions or
among nonincarcerative sanctions. Categorical exceptions are the most
promising tools available for providing that guidance.
Before I describe how that can be done, two simple jurisprudential
concepts that have special relevance to intermediate sanctions should
be introduced. These are the distinctions between purposes of and at
sentencing and the concept of parsimony.
1. Purposes at Sentencing. There has in recent years been wide-
spread belief that abstract sentencing purposes have either near-abso-
lute, or virtually no, relevance to sentencing policy. This is a mistake.
Proponents of just deserts theories (e.g., von Hirsch 1976, 1992) have
urged that ideals of proportionality should be the primary criteria for
setting sentencing policy. Because this would leave little role for reha-
bilitative, deterrent, incapacitative, and other purposes that many pol-
icy makers and practitioners believe are relevant, no jurisdiction has
adopted such a single-purpose scheme. Although indeterminate sen-
tencing was nowhere a single-purpose system, rehabilitative consider-
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ations were especially influential. There are, however, few contempo-
rary proponents of primarily rehabilitative systems.
Most modern sentencing systems purport to be multipurpose, but it
has proven difficult to give operational meaning to that idea. Although
there have long been vigorous debates over the merits of retribution,
reprobation, rehabilitation, prevention, general and specific deter-
rence, and incapacitation as penal goals, consensus is seldom reached
that one is more important than the others. This is partly because the
various purposes are relevant to different cases in different ways.
Among three offenders in a convenience store robbery (without
firearms), for example, one may have been involved in ten prior rob-
beries; incapacitation may seem the most important sentencing pur-
pose and confinement the mechanism. A second may be a drug-
dependent first offender, rehabilitation the most important purpose,
and outpatient drug treatment the mechanism. A third may be a non-
drug-dependent first offender, employed and with a family, retribu-
tion and deterrence the primary purposes, and a combination of a
substantial fine and house arrest during nonworking hours the mecha-
nisms.
The three sentences described in the preceding paragraph are diffi-
cult to reconcile with any single punishment purpose, which is why
policy makers frequently adopt all purposes. The difficulty with this is
that telling a judge that all purposes are relevant provides no guidance
whatever in sentencing particular cases. If the choice is between a sin-
gle purpose or multiple purposes, the lack of guidance may appear un-
avoidable.
These problems go away once a distinction is recognized between
purposes of sentencing and purposes at sentencing. Traditional debates
are about purposes of sentencing, that is, about the overall purposes of
the sentencing process or system. Purposes at sentencing are those that
are relevant to disposition of individual cases, and they vary with the
circumstances of the offense and the offender. The three convenience-
store robbers above offer an example.
The idea of purposes at sentencing is especially relevant to nonin-
carcerative sanctions. When guidelines dealt only with who went to jail
or prison and for how long, the lack of guidance provided by multiple
purposes created few problems. When guidelines encompass interme-
diate sanctions, the idea of purposes at sentencing, when combined
with the idea of categorical exceptions, provides a tool for providing
guidance to judges in choosing among different sanctions. Guidelines
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could easily provide that judges choosing between confinement and
intermediate sanctions, or among intermediate sanctions, are to be
guided by a series of presumptions about purposes relevant to individ-
ual cases. Any sentence inconsistent with the presumption would be a
departure and require provision of reasons that could be reviewed on
appeal.
2. The Principle of Parsimony. The principle of parsimony, or the
concept of the least restrictive appropriate alternative, is a second juris-
prudential idea that is relevant to intermediate sanctions (Morris 1974,
chap. 1; Morris and Tonry 1990, chap. 3). For reasons both of humane
treatment of offenders and economy in public expenditure, law reform
bodies including the American Law Institute (1962) in the Model Pe-
nal Code, the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws (1968), and the American Bar Association (in all three editions
of its standards for sentencing) have long urged adoption of least re-
strictive alternative policies.
The least restrictive alternative concept has a long history. The utili-
tarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham, for example, asserting that all
avoidable human suffering is undesirable, urged adoption of a "princi-
ple of parsimony" by which punishment could be justified only to the
extent that suffering by others was reduced. Contemporary writer
Norval Morris (1974) proposed an influential theory of "limiting retri-
butivism" in which retribution (or "just deserts") sets upper limits on
deserved punishments and lower limits for especially serious crimes;
within those limits concern for parsimony calls for the least restrictive
alternative unless articulable rationales justify harsher treatment for
particular offenders (Frase 1997).
Placed in the context of intermediate sanctions and sentencing
guidelines, concern for parsimony would yield a least-restrictive-alter-
native presumption that intermediate sanctions are to be preferred to
confinement, and among intermediate sanctions the least restrictive
and intrusive among those authorized are to be preferred.
3. Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Guidelines. Efforts to incor-
porate intermediate sanctions into sentencing guidelines are in their
early days. Although current efforts are modest and limited, mecha-
nisms are available from which comprehensive sentencing policies
could be devised that build existing guidelines systems and provide
guidance for judges in all their sentencing decisions.
a. Guidelines Should Contain from Four to Six Zones of Discretion. Po-
lar zones would be those in which the crimes are so serious that any
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punishment less harsh than imprisonment would unduly depreciate the
seriousness of the crime and in which the crimes are so venial that any
punishment harsher than standard probation, a minor fine, or restitu-
tion would be unjust. At least two other zones should be created: one
would authorize restrictive sanctions like inpatient drug or other treat-
ment and partial confinement, the other would authorize less restric-
tive sanctions like day fines, intensive supervision, house arrest, and
community service. At its upper and lower margins, each zone would
overlap with the next, thereby giving judges authority without de-
parting to choose among a wide range of sanctions.
These proposals are but a sketch. A sentencing commission staff
document explaining all the choices made in such a proposed grid, and
the considerations for and against each, might be fifty pages long. Four
general observations might, however, be made.
First, it potentially applies to all guidelines systems, even those like
Florida's, Ohio's, and Delaware's that do not use a grid. The absence
of grids in such jurisdictions is entirely cosmetic. To help overcome
negative judicial stereotypes about guidelines and "sentencing by
mathematics," Delaware's Sentencing Accountability Commission
promulgated its guidelines in narrative form: the normal sentence for
offense X should be Y. This is much less efficient than a grid because
it requires many pages of text, but with a few days' work an analyst
could start from the statements and collapse their content into a grid.
Conversely, the contents of North Carolina's grid, including its inter-
mediate sanctions elements, could be expressed in a lengthy narrative
manual. Except in this paragraph, I discuss grids but always with the
assumption that readers understand that grids, though an efficient way
to organize and display information, are not essential.
Second, in order to maintain norms of proportionality, guideline
cells in each zone could specify maximum durations or amounts for
sanctions authorized in each cell, and these could vary with offense se-
riousness or extent of criminal history. The cells could also specify
maximum aggregate penalties, including back-up sanctions.
Third, grids containing more than four zones could be particularly
useful in setting back-up sanctions when offenders breach conditions
of their sentences. Often today, judges faced with an offender
breaching conditions of a nonincarcerative penalty believe their only
choices are, in effect, to ignore the breach or to lock up the offender.
Under a six-zones-of-discretion system, however, depending on the se-
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riousness of the breach, a judge could punish condition breaches by a
zone 2 offender by imposing sentences authorized by zones 3-6. Policy
statements could provide guidance to judges on the details of revoca-
tion and resentencing to a higher zone's sanctions. Delaware's five
sanction levels are used in this way.
Fourth, the preceding few paragraphs mention confinement only in
reference to the top zone. In practice, both North Carolina and Penn-
sylvania authorize confinement as an alternative to other sanctions in
a large majority of the cells in their guidelines. This undermines the
abstract notion of proportionality in a continuum of sanctions and the
mechanism of zones of discretion. In many jurisdictions, however, the
availability of confinement as an authorized penalty for most crimes
may be politically necessary. This could be achieved by permitting
judges to depart from guidelines in which confinement is not presump-
tively applicable, giving reasons why they are doing so. Even if depar-
ture authority is not enough, because policy makers want the availabil-
ity of confinement to be evident on the face of the guidelines grid,
many concerns about proportionality and predictability can be ad-
dressed by means of categorical exceptions and presumptions. For ex-
ample, cells could authorize both confinement and nonconfinement
sanctions, but subject to a least restrictive appropriate punishment pre-
sumption, that would require judges to provide reasons for imposing
confinement (these could be made appealable, depending on how
strong policy makers want the presumption to be).
b. The Guidelines Should Include Dispositive Presumptions. A signifi-
cant limitation of the zones of discretion approach adopted by North
Carolina and Pennsylvania is that judges are given little guidance in
choosing among types of sanctions authorized in various zones. Many
cells in Pennsylvania's level 2, for example, allow judges to select
among restorative (least severe), intermediate, and short confinement
options. In level 3, judges choose among any intermediate sanction and
prison or jail terms.
Some policy guidance could be given by means of presumptions.
One possibility, mentioned earlier, is to adopt a least restrictive alter-
native presumption and to establish policies that order sanctions in
terms of restrictiveness. One possible ordering might be unsupervised
probation, probation, small fines, community service, large fines, in-
tensive supervision, house arrest, partial or intermittent confinement
(day-reporting centers, halfway houses, night or weekend jail con-
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finement), and total confinement. Judges might be directed to impose
the least restrictive sanction authorized in the applicable cell or to ex-
plain why another sanction was chosen and why each less restrictive
option was deemed inappropriate.
A second, related, possibility is to adopt a series of offender- or of-
fense-specific dispositive presumptions for choosing among sanctions
authorized in the applicable cell. The following are illustrative possi-
bilities.
1. Nonviolent property offenders who are not drug dependent
should ordinarily be sentenced to standard probation, community ser-
vice, or fines (separately or in combination) if those sentences are au-
thorized in the applicable cell.
2. Drug-dependent property, drug, and minor violent (e.g., robber-
ies not involving weapons or injuries) offenders should ordinarily be
required to participate in drug treatment (outpatient or residential, de-
pending on their drug-use history) and, to the extent feasible, should
also be sentenced as if they were not drug-dependent.
3. Persons convicted of crimes involving gratuitous infliction of vio-
lence (that is, beyond that otherwise inherent in their crimes) should
ordinarily be sentenced to confinement.
4. Offenders who are primary care or income providers to their fam-
ilies should ordinarily be sentenced to a community penalty that will
permit them to continue in those roles; any confinement required
should be partial or intermittent.
A sentencing commission might adopt a dozen such dispositive pre-
sumptions. Their cumulative effect would be to provide guidance to
judges in choosing among authorized sanctions. The dispositive pre-
sumptions would interact with the least restrictive alternative presump-
tion. For example, for a drug-dependent person convicted of robbery
not involving guns or injuries, the drug-dependency presumption
would override the least-restrictive-alternative presumption and might,
depending on the circumstances, justify intensive supervision with out-
patient drug treatment or inpatient drug treatment.
Three sets of issues warrant mention. First, a cynic would argue that
a series of presumptions like these would be mere boilerplate that
would either be ignored by judges or invoked disingenuously by rote.
If that is true, dispositive presumptions would add nothing useful, but
they would do no harm. More importantly, however, that view is too
cynical. Judges are sworn to uphold the law and are accustomed to
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working with evidentiary and probative presumptions. Most conscien-
tious judges would take such presumptions seriously, especially if they
comported with widely shared views about meaningful differences be-
tween cases. Even if only some judges took the presumptions seriously,
the overall effect would be to make sentencing more consistent and
predictable.
Second, an observer might suggest that, if greater consistency in use
of intermediate sanctions is a good thing, a series of dispositive pre-
sumptions would leave too much discretion in the hands of judges.
From that perspective, guidelines systems should become much more
detailed and set clear rules tying offenders and particular guideline
cells to particular sanctions. The difficulties with this are that we know
from the federal guidelines experience that judges deeply dislike and
actively resist guidelines that they believe are too rigid and detailed
(M. Tonry 1996, chap. 3). Even were it feasible to devise highly
detailed guidelines for intermediate sanctions, they would likely be
even more detailed than the federal guidelines (which mostly involve
confinement) and provoke similarly negative reactions from judges
and others.
Third, such presumptions would authorize imposition of different
kinds of punishments on "like-situated" offenders, which would violate
just deserts concerns that sentencing should be tied only or primarily
to the severity of the crime. This is true. To people who are persuaded
by the purposes of and at sentencing distinction, it will be unimport-
ant; the distinction is premised on the assumption that many or most
judges believe that both the offense and the offender's ethically rele-
vant circumstances are relevant sentencing considerations.
c. Guidelines Should Authorize Judges to Declare and Be Guided by the
Relevant Purposes at Sentencing in Every Case. This concept provides a
rationale for the use of dispositive presumptions. Whether there are
three, six, or ten zones of discretion, for all but the most and least seri-
ous offenses judges would often be able to choose among generically
different penalties.
Whether a particular penalty is appropriate often depends on the of-
fender's characteristics. For crimes of comparable severity, falling in
the same offense-severity level of a guidelines grid, but of different
character, noncustodial penalties may be variously appropriate.
1. For a drug-dependent shoplifter or burglar or a drug dealer, pre-
vention of future crimes and rehabilitation may be the most important
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purposes at sentencing; compulsory drug treatment (residential or out-
patient backed up by intensive supervision, depending on the offend-
er's drug problem and prior treatment experience) might be the opti-
mal primary sentence with restitution or community service as an
adjunct.
2. For a bank-teller embezzler, retribution and general deterrence
may be predominant purposes at sentencing, and restitution and com-
munity service or a fine the optimal sentences.
3. For the perpetrator of a commercial fraud, retribution and general
deterrence may be the predominant purposes and restitution, stigma-
tizing community service, and a very substantial fine the optimal sen-
tence.
4. For an employed blue-collar head of family who has committed a
serious assault while intoxicated, retribution and deterrence may be the
predominant purposes and a substantial fine and nighttime and week-
end confinement the optimal sentence, thereby permitting him to con-
tinue to work and support his family.
5. For a third-time street mugger, deterrence and incapacitation may
be the predominant purposes, and a short period of confinement fol-
lowed by intensive supervision the optimal sentence.
Current guidelines systems provide no guidance to judges in dis-
criminating among different offenders falling in the same guidelines
categories. A purposes-at-sentencing approach would provide a frame-
work within which judges could work, and their statements of govern-
ing purposes and their relation to the sentence imposed would enable
observers to understand the judge's reasoning. There is a reasonable
chance that greater consistency in sentences would result.
d. Guidelines Should Establish Policies concerning Categorical Excep-
tions. Some types of offenders have distinctive characteristics or pres-
ent distinctive challenges that may justify having every case decided on
its individual merits. Policies governing such offenders are typically
permissive rather than presumptive. They authorize but do not direct
the judge to treat defined categories of offenders as eligible for excep-
tional treatment.
First offenders are one example. Washington's first-offender excep-
tion authorizes judges to disregard the applicable guidelines and im-
pose some other, usually less intrusive or burdensome, sentence.
Sometimes this may be because the offense seems out of character and
unlikely to be repeated, and the offender a fundamentally law-abiding
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person. Sometimes it may be because the offense occurred under cir-
cumstances of unusual stress or emotionality. Sometimes it may be be-
cause the defendant's family would suffer unduly were he incarcerated.
Whatever the reasons, first offenders often provoke compassion from
judges and prosecutors; a permissive exception would allow them
openly to treat the case as special rather than, as often happens, do so
surreptitiously.
Intrafamilial sex offenders are another example. Because such of-
fenses often involve psychopathology, because a prison sentence will
break up the family, possibly leaving the victim feeling guilt-ridden for
having done so, and because such conditions are sometimes success-
fully treated, judges will often be more interested in treatment and
family preservation than in deterrence and retribution. Yet guidelines
often set lengthy presumptive prison sentences for sex offenses. Creat-
ing a permissive exception allows judges openly to impose what seem
to them to be just and appropriate sentences.
There is partial overlap between permissive exceptions and both
the purposes at sentencing notion and creation of dispositive pre-
sumptions. The purposes-at-sentencing notion, however, deals with
judges' discretion as bounded by applicable guidelines cells and
zones. Permissive exceptions are broader and apply throughout the
guidelines system. Permissive exceptions and dispositional presump-
tions differ with their literal meanings. Exceptions are permissive;
they authorize but do not direct judges to treat cases exceptionally.
Presumptions do direct judges to treat cases in a particular way;
judges who choose to do otherwise must offer convincing reasons for
why they did so.
HI. Conclusion
Together, the suggestions offered in this essay for incorporating inter-
mediate sanctions into sentencing guidelines may appear to constitute
a system of bewildering complexity, but that is a misimpression. Each
of the suggestions is simple. Because they move beyond current prac-
tice and are discussed in close succession, they appear more compli-
cated than they are. Singly or together they constitute modest incre-
mental steps toward creating comprehensive sentencing systems that
incorporate confinement and nonconfinement sanctions and attempt
to achieve reasonable consistency in sentencing while allowing judges
to take account of meaningful differences between cases.
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